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All usA randomized control trial with 432 small and medium enterprises in
Mexico shows positive impact of access to 1 year of management con-
sulting services on total factor productivity and return on assets. Own-
ers also had an increase in “entrepreneurial spirit” (an index that mea-
sures entrepreneurial confidence and goal setting). Using Mexican
social security data, we find a persistent large increase (about 50 per-
cent) in the number of employees and total wage bill even 5 years after
the program. We document large heterogeneity in the specific mana-
gerial practices that improved as a result of the consulting, with the
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AllI. IntroductionA large literature in development economics and entrepreneurship aims
to understand the impediments to firm growth, especially for small and
medium-sized enterprises. Most of the focus thus far has been on finan-
cial constraints as a central obstacle to firm growth. For example, empir-
ical studies have examined these constraints at themicro level (with lend-
ing experiments, see the review article by Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman
[2015]; with cash grant experiments, see de Mel, McKenzie, and Wood-
ruff [2008], Karlan, Knight, and Udry [2015], and McKenzie [2015])
as well as at the macro level (King and Levine 1993; Rajan and Zingales
1998). However, capital alone cannot explain the entirety of firm growth;
“managerial capital” is needed to know how to employ the capital best.
We argue thatmanagerial capital can directly affect the firmby improving
strategic and operational decisions but can also affect the firm by increas-
ing the productivity of other factors, such as physical capital and labor, by
helping the firm use them more efficiently.1 The multidimensional im-
pact of managerial capital and its interaction with other factors often
makes its effect difficult to measure empirically.
Recent work has shown enormous heterogeneity inmanagement prac-
tices and CEO styles across firms; see, for example, Bertrand and Schoar
(2003), Bennedsen et al. (2007), and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007,
2010). At the same time, there is also large heterogeneity in themeasured
productivity of firms; see, for example, Syverson (2011). But a central
question remains: Is this observed heterogeneity a reflection of an opti-
mal match between the underlying fundamentals of different firms
and the type of management that is needed given the firm’s state of de-
velopment? Or is lack of managerial capital a first-order impediment to
firm growth and profitability, since managers might be constrained in
the acquisition of these skills? See, for example, Gompers, Lerner, and
Scharfstein (2005) or Caselli and Gennaioli (2013).
We test if alleviating the constraints on managerial capital has a first-
order effect on the performance and growth of small enterprises in
emerging markets and, if so, which dimensions of managerial capital
are particularly important for firm performance. For that purpose, we
set up a randomized controlled trial in Puebla, Mexico, in which 432 mi-1 Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010) discuss at more length the role of “managerial cap-
ital” as a key component for enterprise development, distinct from human capital.
was provided by the government of the State of Puebla, via the Consejo para el Desarrollo
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 637cro, small, and medium-sized enterprises applied to receive subsidized
consulting services, and 150 out of the 432 were randomly chosen to re-
ceive the treatment. The remaining 282 enterprises served as a control
group that did not receive any subsidized consulting services. We focus
on micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises since they are often seen
as highly affected by limitations in managerial capital and have strong
potential for scale-up if bottlenecks to their growth can be removed.2
The intervention aims to expand the managerial skills of the owner-
managers by giving them access to subsidized consulting and mentoring
services. Treated enterprises were matched with one of nine local con-
sulting firms on the basis of the specialized services they needed. Enter-
prises met with their consultants for 4 hours per week over a 1-year pe-
riod. The enterprise owner and consulting firm decided jointly on the
focus and scope of the consulting services based on a daylong diagnostic
consultation between the enterprise and the consulting firm.
We measure impacts on the firms and the owner-managers in two dif-
ferent ways: (1) we administer surveys at baseline and a 1-year follow-up,
and (2) we obtain confidential administrative data on employment levels
and total wages for the firms in our treatment and control groups using
7 years of annual data (2 years prior to 5 years after the intervention)
from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). The administrative
data on firm outcomes remove the self-reporting biases that can be pres-
ent in survey data.
We have three primary sets of results: First, we show that the consult-
ing intervention has a positive short-run impact on the productivity, re-
turn on assets (ROA), and profits of the enterprises in the treatment
group in the 1-year follow-up. Productivity and ROA increase by one-fifth
of a standard deviation and profits increase by about one-tenth of a stan-
dard deviation compared to the control group. However, the effects on
profits and ROA are not robust to all econometric specifications and as-
sumptions regarding outliers. At the same time, the coefficients on indi-
vidual input factors such as change in sales, assets, and the number of
workers employed are not statistically significantly different from zero.
This result is consistent with the idea that both the mistakes that firms
were making and the impact of the consulting intervention are hetero-
geneous: for some, the improved managerial knowledge might have
led to the realization that they need to invest more while for others it
led to the realization that they need to shed unproductive assets and in-
puts or lay off unproductive workers.
Second, in the longer run, administrative data collected from the
IMSS reveal important impacts on employment: the number of employ-2 In addition, for small businesses run by the owner-manager, it is simple to determine
the appropriate target for a managerial capital intervention.
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Allees increases 57 percent and the total wage bill increases 72 percent.
While we do not find an immediate increase in employment within
the first year of treatment (which is in line with the results reported from
the follow-up survey), we see an important increase in aggregate employ-
ment over the five post years 2010–14. And although the year-to-year
change is imprecisely estimated, the difference between treatment and
control increases each year except the fifth. These results suggest a per-
sistent impact of the consulting on managerial capital. The point esti-
mates of the positive treatment effects are quite large, but plausible, par-
ticularly given that the confidence interval includes more modest impacts
and excludes zero. Furthermore, large treatment effects are plausible;
since the majority of the enterprises in our sample were relatively small
and the majority of owner-managers had not received any formal man-
agement training prior to our intervention, any improvements that led
to the hiring of even a single worker would have been a noticeable in-
crease in employment. The long-term results from the administrative data
also suggest that the 1-year survey results were not merely a by-product of
a positive reporting bias.
Third, and finally, we analyze the specific channels (the management
practices) by which small businesses improve in response to the interven-
tions, such as finance, marketing, operations management, and so forth.
We find that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the business practices that
small andmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seek to improve.Out of 11man-
agement practices that we asked about in the surveys, we find only two
that are consistently mentioned and show statistically significant changes
in likelihood after the intervention: (1) engaging in marketing efforts and
(2) keeping formal accounts about their firms. The other management di-
mensions are mentioned with almost equal frequency across the enterprise
owners, again highlighting that there are important heterogeneities in
management needs of different SMEs. From case study evidence, we also
identify long-term planning and business mission definition as a key activ-
ity with the consultants (see table 1).
We show that as a whole, these changes led to improvement in the
overall confidence and control that micro, small, and medium-sized en-
terprise owners have in their business based on an index of “entrepre-
neurial spirit.” The entrepreneurial spirit index was constructed using
a number of questions we asked owners/managers about their confi-
dence in their management skills and their ability to grow their firm
and handle difficulties.3 Although the individual components of the in-
dex are each imprecisely estimated, in particular, the components that
seem to drive the result are goal related: having professional goals, revis-3 These questions were inspired by the “locus of control” literature in psychology (see,
e.g., Furnham and Steele 1993).
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 639ing goals periodically, and needing daily goals to feel satisfied. To better
understand the nature of these answers we also conducted in-depth in-
terviews with two of the consulting firms after the intervention was con-
cluded. In line with our case study evidence, the consultants highlighted
that the enterprises they worked with during the program lacked a clear
vision and definition of goals for the future and that they focused only
on their day-to-day operations prior to the treatment. During the pro-
gram, the consultant helped the owners/managers to define a growth
strategy or business plan. This suggests that the large long-run impact
of the treatment seems to have been in part due to firms defining clear
goals and laying out a strategy for how to get there.
Our intervention documents the complexity and multidimensional
nature of managerial decisions. While gaps in marketing and accounting
knowledge as well as lack of long-term planning were most prominent
across the sample, there seems to be a lot of heterogeneity in the specific
bundle of knowledge gaps that enterprises face. This heterogeneity poses
particular challenges for assessing interventions that aim to improve
managerial capital and business outcomes (for more discussion of this,
see Fischer and Karlan [2015]). To help us put more texture around the
specific types of problems that were addressed in the consultations, in
online appendix 1, we provide eight detailed narratives of the consulting
advice provided to firms and the perceptions of the owners and consult-
ants of their impact. These narratives tell a consistent story of complex-
ity: lack of managerial capital is a first-order constraint for SMEs. However,
there seems to be no silver bullet, that is, no single mechanism that when
taught unleashes growth for these enterprises.TABLE 1
Topics That Firms Worked On with Their Consultant Based on Eight
Qualitative Case Studies of Treated Firms
Topic
Number of Firms That
Covered This Topic
Define mission and vision statements 6
Accounting and record keeping (training and/or new software) 5
Clarify organizational structure, clearly assign responsibilities 5
Sales strategy and advertising (marketing) 4
Strategically select location and number of sales points 2
Quality control 2
Access to credit or alternative financing solutions 2
Human resources management and hiring practices 2
Mediate family problems in family firms 1
Pricing strategy 1
Reduce costs (negotiate with suppliers, find alternative suppliers) 1
Figure out which products are most profitable and focus on these 1
Teamwork and communications training for employees 1
Leadership training for firm owners 1This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on Febru
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AllAs one caveat, it is important to note that this intervention, like all
skill-building experiments that have been conducted thus far, is a joint
test of two closely related hypotheses: on the one hand, we aim to estab-
lish if managerial capital is a limiting factor in the growth of enterprises.
But at the same time, we can find a positive answer only if this knowledge
can be conveyed via a consulting intervention in the first place. It could
be that managerial capital is indeed a hindrance to growth, but it might
not be possible to transfer this knowledge by simply providing consulting
services. Therefore, failure to find a result here would not prove that
managerial capital does not matter, but may simply mean that this pro-
gram was not effective in the transmission of managerial skills (or that
managerial skills are innate skills and simply not teachable). However,
this exercise provides a lower bound on the potential impact of improve-
ments in managerial capital, given the limitation of the efficacy of this
particular intervention to actually improve managerial capital.
Research and practice have recently seen a flurry of programs focused
on developing managerial capital for micro enterprises. The interven-
tions vary widely in the scope of the management skills that are transmit-
ted and the type of enterprises that are targeted. The training is typically
provided as in-class training and often linked with a microcredit pro-
gram. For example, Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) and Karlan and Val-
divia (2011) evaluate what is best described as in-class programs. These
papers show that traditional micro enterprise training seems to affect
the command of accounting practices for micro enterprises but has lim-
ited to no effects on actual firm outcomes and performance. More re-
cently, Bruhn and Zia (2011) and Giné andMansuri (2014) also find that
in-class training for micro entrepreneurs leads to improvements in busi-
ness practices but has only limited effects on business performance and
sales. Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2014) show that training programs
for SMEs increase in impact if they are targeted to the owner’s level of
sophistication: a simple rule-of-thumb training has large impacts on real
outcomes for micro entrepreneurs who have low educational attainment
and poor business practices prior to the intervention, but not on more
advanced businesses. For micro-sized firms, Karlan et al. (2015) provide
the closest analogue in terms of the intervention design, as it is one-on-
one consulting services and not group-based training; however, the re-
sults are starkly different, as Karlan et al. find short-run negative treat-
ment effects from consulting and long-run null effects.
The study by Bloom et al. (2013) is more closely related to our study in
that they evaluate the impact of intensive consulting services from an in-
ternational management consulting firm on the business practices of
large Indian textile firms. The average firm in their sample has about
270 employees, whereas the average number of employees in our study
is 14. Bloom et al. find that even these larger firms were unaware of manyThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 641modern management practices, and treated plants improved their man-
agement practices during the intervention. The approaches of Bloom
et al. and this study are complementary in nature: Bloom et al. focus
on a small set of large firms in one industry—textile manufacturing—
with a tightly defined intervention employing a major international con-
sulting firm. Such focus provides clear estimates of a specific manage-
ment intervention, including mechanisms in terms of business practice
changes, but it does not allow the authors to test if lack ofmanagerial cap-
ital is a widespread problem. Our current study includes a larger set of
firms and industries (close to 400 firms compared to 20 experimental
plants in Bloom et al.’s study) and employs a heterogeneous set of local
consulting firms. Therefore, we are able to establish that managerial cap-
ital constraints are important for a wider set of small businesses and affect
business practices onmany dimensions. We can provide proof of the con-
cept that general increases in managerial capital for small businesses can
improve firm performance and growth. But the trade-off is that we can-
not estimate the returns to one specificmanagement intervention or spe-
cific changes in particular business practices.
Using a different methodological approach, Giorcelli (2016) also pro-
vides similar evidence for the positive impact from building manage-
ment practice on business outcomes in Italy during the 1950s. On the
basis of a natural experiment from the Marshall Plan, Giorcelli finds lim-
ited evidence of an immediate impact on business outcomes but growing
returns at 5, 10, and 15 years after the treatment (in this case the treat-
ment is management training visits of Italian managers to US firms).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we
describe the subsidized consulting program. Section III discusses the ex-
perimental setup, data collection, and characteristics of our sample. Sec-
tion IV gives the results, examining both business outcomes and business
process variables. Section V asks why more enterprises do not use con-
sulting services, that is, given these results, what the possible market fail-
ures in the consulting services industry are. Section VI presents conclu-
sions.II. Consulting ProgramThe randomized controlled trial was conducted with the Puebla Institute
for Competitive Productivity (known as IPPC, after its Spanish acronym),
a training institute set up by theMinistry of Labor of theMexican State of
Puebla. IPPC implemented a business development program to provide
participating enterprises with subsidized consulting services from one of
a number of local consulting firms. The program, which started inMarch
2008 and ended in February 2009, aimed to include 100 micro, 40 small,
and 10 medium-sized enterprises but eventually included 108 micro en-This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
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Allterprises, 34 small enterprises, and 8 medium-sized enterprises.4 The pri-
mary goal was to help enterprises reach the next size category by the end
of the program and thus contribute to job creation and economic growth
of the region.
Consultants were asked to (1) diagnose the problems that prevented
the enterprises from growing, (2) suggest solutions that would help to
solve these problems, and (3) assist enterprises in implementing the so-
lutions. The consultants dedicated 4 hours per week to each enterprise.
The program was originally intended to last 2 years but ended prema-
turely after 1 year because of government funding issues. (No results from
the study had been released when the funding decision was made; thus,
the decision was not related to perceived performance of the program.)
The consulting services were highly subsidized by the State of Puebla.
Micro enterprises paid only 10 percent of the market cost of the consult-
ing services, small enterprises 20 percent, and medium-sized enterprises
about 30 percent. The unsubsidized cost of the consulting services varied
by firm size but was equivalent to about US$57 (700 Mexican pesos) per
hour on average, amounting toUS$11,856 per firm for 1 year (4 hours for
52 weeks).
Consulting firms were selected through a competitive bidding process.
In response to a call for proposals put out by IPPC, 11 consulting firms
submitted proposals to participate in the program. Two firms were elim-
inated on the basis of inadequate references from former clients. The
majority of the participating firms were private local consulting firms that
usually work with micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. All con-
sulting firms signed a contract with IPPC that required them to spend
4 hours per week with each enterprise. IPPC monitored consultants by
requiring consultants and enterprises to periodically submit documenta-
tion related to the program. Enterprise owners also came to IPPC’s of-
fices in person every quarter to pay their share of the program costs,
which provided an opportunity to voice complaints. In addition, a local
project supervisor from Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), whowas liv-
ing in Puebla to manage the project evaluation, conducted monitoring
visits to program enterprises.
At the beginning of the program, principal decision makers from all
program enterprises, as well as most employees, completed a computer-
ized test that determined their individual strengths and talents. This test
was based on Gallup’s StrengthFinder method, and IPPC was licensed to4 As defined by the Mexican Ministry of the Economy, micro enterprises have up to 10
full-time employees. Small enterprises have between 11 and 50 full-time employees in the
manufacturing and services sectors and between 11 and 30 full-time employees in the com-
merce sector. Medium-sized enterprises have up to 100 full-time employees in the service
and commerce sectors and up to 250 full-time employees in the manufacturing sector.
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 643conduct this test in Puebla. IPPC encouraged enterprises to use the re-
sults of this test to help assign employees to responsibilities on the basis
of their strengths as identified by the StrengthFinder method. The con-
sultants were trained to help the enterprises interpret and apply the
results to their labor decisions. For example, one talent was “communica-
tion”whereas another was “operations.” Employees with the communica-
tion talent were particularly suited to interacting with clients, while em-
ployees with the operations talent would do well at record keeping and
accounting.
Apart from the employee talent diagnostic, the content of the consult-
ing varied across enterprises depending on their needs. In order to gain
an understanding of the issues that enterprises worked on with their
mentors, we conducted in-depth, qualitative case studies of eight treat-
ment enterprises. Table 1 lists the areas that these eight enterprises cov-
ered with their consultants, along with the number of enterprises that
worked on each topic. Almost all enterprises started by establishing mis-
sion and vision statements with their consultants, setting specific goals
for what they wanted to achieve in the future and throughout the pro-
gram.Most enterprises also worked on improving accounting and record
keeping (through training and/or use of new software), clearly assigning
staff responsibilities, and sales strategy and advertising. Apart from these
common topics, the remaining topics covered are diverse, including op-
timizing the number and location of points of sale, quality control, access
to credit or alternative financing solutions, pricing strategy, teamwork,
and leadership training. This diversity reflects the fact that the consul-
tants tailored their advice to each enterprise’s individual challenges, lead-
ing them to work on different areas with each enterprise.
Each of the eight case studies is presented in online appendix 1.III. Experimental Setup and DataIPPC advertised the program throughout the State of Puebla via business
associations, at trade fairs, and at various media outlets in order to attract
an initial sample of interested micro, small, and medium-sized enter-
prises.5 The program was open to enterprises that were formally regis-
tered with the government and were paying taxes. In response to the ad-
vertising, 432 enterprises expressed interest in the program and signed a
letter of interest.
Data come from two sources: first, baseline and follow-up surveys
of these interested enterprises were conducted between October and
December 2007 (baseline) and between March 2009 and June 20095 We do not have data on the channel through which enterprises learned of the pro-
gram and thus cannot test any theories of heterogeneity with respect to this.
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All(follow-up).6 These surveys collected information on enterprise charac-
teristics and performance, as well as on business practices and character-
istics of the enterprise’s principal decision maker (typically the owner or
manager). Second, from the IMSS, we secured wage and employment data
for two pre-intervention years (2005 and 2006) and five post-intervention
years (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014). We tried to conduct a second
follow-up survey in 2014 but encountered a very high nonresponse rate
(see online app. 3: 2014 Follow-Up Survey).
Using data from the baseline survey, 150 enterprises were randomly se-
lected to participate in the program.7 The randomization was stratified by
sector (manufacturing, services, and commerce) and enterprise size (micro,
small, and medium-sized) and was conducted through a Stata program that
was run on the premises of IPPC in the presence of government officials
and a public notary, who certified that the assignment to the treatment group
was random, that is, not rerun depending on any particular assignment.8
Out of the 150 enterprises in the treatment group, 80 then took up the
consulting services.9 The remaining 70 treatment group enterprises de-
clined to participate in the program although they had initially signed a
letter of interest saying that they would participate if offered a spot. The6 The baseline survey was conducted by a local professional survey firm under the super
vision of the Mexico country office of IPA. For the follow-up survey, IPA hired surveyors
(graduate students and recent graduates) directly. IPA trained the surveyors, and our loca
project staff managed and supervised the implementation of the follow-up survey.
7 We originally had 434 observations in the randomization and assigned 150 of them to
treatment, but we later discovered that two firms had expressed interest in the program
twice under separate names. For this reason, we had to drop two observations, giving us
432 unique firms. In one of the cases, both separate names were in the control group, and we
dropped one of these. In the other case, one name was assigned to the treatment group and
the other to the control group. Here, we had to keep the firm in the treatment group since i
had already been notified that it had been randomly selected to participate in the program.
8 Within strata, the Stata code automatically re-randomized as follows. We first allocated
firms to the treatment and control groups on the basis of a randomly generated number
Using this allocation, we then calculated the maximum and the average t -statistics on the
differences in averages across the treatment and control groups for the following variables
within Puebla City dummy, business age, total asset value, profit margin, measured risk
aversion, entrepreneurial spirit index, currently has a loan from a financial institution
dummy, principal decision maker’s hours worked, principal decision maker’s age, prin
cipal decision maker’s gender, principal decision maker’s years of schooling, principal de
cision maker is of indigenous background dummy, as well as two dummies indicating
whether the firm has participated in other IPPC programs. If the maximum t-statistic for
these variables was higher than 1.25 or the average t-statistic was higher than 0.35, we drew
a new random number and allocated firms to the treatment and control groups on the ba
sis of this new number. We repeated this process until the maximum t-statistic was 1.25 or
lower and the average t-statistic was 0.35 or lower. Research by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009)
that was conducted after our randomization finds that this way of re-randomizing is no lon
ger the preferred method. In our data analysis, we make the necessary adjustments for the
randomization method suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie; i.e., in our regressions we con
trol for all variables used in the re-randomization.
9 Because of an administrative error, there was also one control group firm that was in
vited to participate, and did, in the program. For analysis purposes, we adhere to the ran
dom assignment, and this enterprise is included in the control group.
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 645take-up rate was higher among enterprises in the services and manufac-
turing sectors (56.6 percent and 53.5 percent, respectively), compared
to enterprises in the commerce sector (48.7 percent). Most enterprises
that chose not to participate said their financial situation had changed
since they signed the letter of interest and they no longer had sufficient
funds to pay the fee (albeit subsidized) for the consulting services. IPPC
paired the 80 treatment group enterprises that took up the program
with consulting firms according to the consultants’ sector and enterprise
size expertise, as well as geographic restrictions. Figure 1 includes a com-
prehensive project time line, illustrating how the dates for data collec-
tion, randomization, and program implementation line up.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of baseline characteristics for enter-
prises and their principal decision makers in the treatment and control
groups. About 30 percent of enterprises in each group operated in the
manufacturing sector, 25 percent in the commerce sector, and 45 percent
in the services sector. On average, the enterprises in the study had about
14 full-time paid employees and were slightly over 10 years old. The enter-
prises’ principal decision makers were, on average, 43 years old, 72 percent
of themweremen, andonaverage theyhadcompleted16 years of schooling.
Panel C of table 2 displays our main measures of business perfor-
mance, starting with sales (online app. 2: Surveys and Data Definitions
provides details of the survey questions and definitions). Our baseline
measure of sales is the average of monthly sales in July, August, and Sep-
tember 2007.10 This variable varies widely in our sample. At baseline,FIG. 1.—Time line10 About 2.5 percent of enterprises report zero sales for all 3 months (this percentage is
not statistically different across the treatment and control groups). Since these enterprises
report having employees, as well as assets, and report nonzero hours worked and costs, we
assume that they did not want to report their sales and thus replaced their sales with miss-
ing (it is unlikely that they had zero sales in all 3 months and are still in business). We apply
the same procedure to the follow-up data, where about 3.5 percent of both treatment and
control enterprises report zero sales for all 3 months (December 2008, January 2009, and
February 2009 in the follow-up survey). Our measure of sales is thus greater than zero for
all enterprises.
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 649average sales in the treatment group were US$79,163 with a standard de-
viation of 288,679, and US$55,258 in the control group, with a standard
deviation of 140,493. To reduce the noise in this variable, we winsorize
the top and bottom 1 percent of outliers.11 The averages of winsorized sales
are more similar across the treatment and control groups (US$67,434 and
US$54,450, respectively) than for the unwinsorized variables, although
no differences are statistically significant for either the winsorized or un-
winsorized data.
Our baseline measure of profits is calculated as September 2007 sales
minus September 2007 costs (unlike sales, we collected costs for only
1 month in the surveys).12
We calculate two separate measures of enterprise productivity. The
first is the residual from a regression of log sales on log employees and
log business assets. The second is return on assets (ROA), defined as
profits (calculated as sales minus costs) divided by business assets.
Similarly to sales, the variances of profits, productivity, and ROA are
large.13 For this reason, we include the averages of the 1 percent win-
sorized variables in table 2, wherewewinsorized the top and bottom1per-
cent of outliers as described in note 11. After winsorizing, average base-
line profits are the same in the treatment and control groups (about
US$10,000). Overall, we find no statistically significant differences in
business performance variables at baseline.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 2 examine whether there are differences
between the treatment group enterprises that took up the program at
baseline and treatment group enterprises that did not take up the pro-
gram. We find that enterprises that took up the program are more likely
to be inmanufacturing, have a larger number of full-time paid employees,
have male decision makers, and are older. In addition, panel C of table 2
shows that enterprises that took up the program were more productive at
baseline than enterprises that did not take up the program.11 Since our sample includes micro, small, and medium-sized firms and to avoid simply
winsorizing the largest firms instead of true outliers, we use the following procedure when
winsorizing sales. We regress sales on a set of firm size dummies (micro, small, andmedium),
and for firms with residuals from this regression that are below the bottom1 percent or above
the top 1 percent, we replace sales with the predicted value plus the residual at the top and
bottom 1 percent or top 1 percent. We use an analogous procedure for all other winsorized
and trimmed variables.
12 De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009) suggest asking business owners what their
profits are in one simple question as an alternative to calculating profits based on re-
sponses to specific components. We tried this approach but had a very high nonresponse
rate to this question.
13 Also note that not all enterprises that answered the baseline survey reported the busi-
ness performance variables, as shown in col. 7 of table 2 (panel C). The response rate is
lowest for business assets, which only 313 out of 432 enterprises (72 percent) reported.
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AllWe conducted the follow-up survey between March and June 2009
(i.e., 1–4 months after the intervention ended, which is 12–16 months
after the intervention began), reinterviewing 378 enterprises or 88 per-
cent of the 432 enterprises interviewed at baseline, to measure the im-
pact of the consulting services on business outcomes. Out of the 54 en-
terprises that could not be reinterviewed, 11 enterprises were confirmed
closed, 31 declined to participate in the interview, and seven enterprises
could not be tracked down despite repeated contact attempts.14 The re-
maining five enterprises had merged with another enterprise—one of
them with an enterprise outside our sample and two with two other en-
terprises in the sample. For these five enterprises, we were not able to
obtain separate data for the unit corresponding to the original enter-
prise, and thus they are not included in the analysis. We provide an anal-
ysis of attrition rates and correlates with baseline information in appen-
dix table A1. This analysis shows that there are no differential attrition
rates in the follow-up survey across treatment and control groups; nei-
ther do we see compositional shifts (col. 3).15
Next, since all enterprises were formally registered with the tax author-
ity, we secured administrative employment data (number of employees
and total wage bill) from the IMSS, the equivalent of the US Social Secu-
rity Administration. We collected each firm’s taxpayer number (RFC)
during our baseline and follow-up surveys. Using these RFC numbers,
we were able to obtain the mean and standard deviation in the treatment
and control groups (but not individual firm-level data) for 2 years prior
to the intervention and 5 years following.
In Mexico, all enterprises are required to register their paid employ-
ees with IMSS, but in practice, not all enterprises register their workers,
even if the enterprise itself is registered with the tax authority. Some en-
terprises also register only a fraction of their paid workers with IMSS.
Close to 57 percent of the enterprises in our sample were matched with
IMSS records. In addition to underregistration, two other potential rea-
sons why enterprises are not found in the IMSS data are that (1) some
firms in our sample do not have paid employees and (2) some RFC num-14 We verified with the former principal decision maker and/or neighbors that these en-
terprises had indeed closed. The percentage of closed enterprises was lower in the treat-
ment group (1.4 percent) than in the control group (3.3 percent). However, the difference
is not statistically significant. The percentage of enterprises that refused the interview was
slightly higher in the control group (8.7 percent) than in the treatment group (5.6 per-
cent), but the difference is not statistically significant.
15 Not all enterprises that answered the follow-up survey responded to each question.
For this reason, our business outcome variables are missing for part of the sample. We tested
whether the likelihood of havingmissing business outcomes variables due to either attrition
or nonresponse differed statistically significantly across the treatment and control groups
and do not find this to be the case.
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 651bers may contain typos, although we tried to clean them up as much as
possible. The percentage of matched enterprises is not statistically signif-
icantly different in the treatment and the control groups (58.7 percent
and 56.7 percent, respectively).
We obtained IMSS data for two pre-intervention time periods ( June 30,
2005, and June 30, 2006), as well as five post-intervention time periods
( June 30, 2010, June 30, 2011, June 30, 2012, June 30, 2013, and June 30,
2014), on (1) number of full-time employees and (2) total daily wage bill
paid to these employees. For confidentiality reasons, IMSS staff could
not share enterprise-level data. Instead, they provided averages and stan-
dard deviations for the treatment and control groups. IMSS also provided
a list of the firms that had successfully been matched with their database.
Appendix table A2 reports attrition analysis for IMSS data; we find neither
differential attrition for treatment on average (cols. 1 and 2) nor compo-
sitional changes (col. 3; aggregate p-value of .122 for the F-test of joint sig-
nificance all interaction terms). The analysis does suggest though that
firms with a higher number of baseline employees are somewhat more
likely to be found in the IMSS data in the control group compared to the
treatment group. For this reason, average employment in the IMSS data
before the intervention, that is, in both 2005 and 2006, is higher in the con-
trol group (about eight full-time employees) than in the treatment group
(6.2 full-time employees).IV. Results and Discussion
A. Short-Run Business PerformanceTable 3 reports the main specification, using ordinary least squares
(OLS) to compare treatment to control in the cross section. All regres-
sions include controls for the variables used for stratification (both the
strata dummies and the re-randomization variables) as suggested in
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and a control for the timing of the survey.16
In column 1, we estimate the average intent-to-treat (ITT) effect without16 Because of baseline data entry typos that were discovered and corrected after the ran-
domization took place, a few values of the variables included in the randomization procedure
do not correspond to the true baseline values. The strata dummies and re-randomization con-
trols included in the regressions contain the values originally used in the randomization pro-
cedure. All other baseline data used in the summary statistics and regressions contain the
correct baseline values. Appendix table A3 shows that 70.4 percent of treatment group en-
terprises and 62.6 percent of control group enterprises were interviewed inMarch (p5 .12).
Almost all the remaining enterprises were interviewed in April 2009 or May 2009, with only
four enterprises being interviewed in June 2009. Treatment and control enterprises are
equally likely to have been interviewed in either March or April (percentage point differ-
ence of 1.3 and p -value of .66).
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Allcontrolling for the baseline value of the outcome variable, and in col-
umn 2 we report the average ITTeffect with controlling for the baseline
value of the outcome variable. For observations in which the baseline
value of the outcome is missing, we replace this value with zero and in-
clude a dummy variable indicating that the value is missing, in order
to keep the observation in the sample.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show short-term treatment effects of con-
sulting on enterprise productivity as measured by the residual from a
productivity regression (0.21 standard deviations increase, standard er-
ror [SE] 5 0.11 standard deviations) and by ROA (0.22 standard devia-
tions, SE 5 0.13 standard deviations). We find positive but not statisti-
cally significant point estimates on the short-term treatment effects for
paid employees, log sales, and profits, and we find negative but also
not statistically significant point estimates on sales, log total employees,
and log of firm assets. The confidence interval for the null results (seen
by dividing the standard error from cols. 1 and 2 by the control group
standard deviation in col. 7) is typically about 0.1–0.2 standard devia-
tions. To deal with noise in survey responses we also perform three main
robustness checks of the results. First, we winsorize the outcome vari-
ables at the 1 percent level to check whether the results are driven by out-
liers (table 3, cols. 3 and 4).17 Second, we trim the outcome variables at
the 1 percent level (table 3, cols. 5 and 6). The results do not change
qualitatively, but in the trimmed sample the treatment effect on profits
becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Third, we restrict
the sample to the 221 enterprises that report all outcome variables at
follow-up and run all of the same regressions (app. table A4).
In app. table A5 we also estimate a difference-in-difference specifica-
tion for the same set of dependent variables as in table 3 rather than a
cross-sectional specification. These results are not as efficient as the anal-
ysis of covariance in table 3 when outcomes have low autocorrelation, as
in our data (see McKenzie 2012). The estimates for ROA remain similar
in terms of statistical significance, but the standard errors for the pro-
ductivity residual increase. For app. table A5, we again use the full sam-
ple, a 1 percent winsorized sample, and a 1 percent trimmed sample.1817 We also replicated the analysis using a 5 percent winsorized sample, and the results are
virtually unchanged.
18 As an additional check, app. table A6 displays average business outcomes from the
follow-up survey in the treatment and control groups, as well as in the group of treatment
enterprises that took up the program. A simple comparison of follow-up survey means in
the treatment and control groups shows a positive effect of the consulting services on pro-
ductivity. Comparing only enterprises that took up the program to control group enter-
prises shows even larger differences in both productivity and ROA (this comparison is
not causal; in particular, note that at baseline the enterprises that took up the program al-
ready had higher productivity and ROA than enterprises that did not take up the program,
as shown in table 2).
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 655We explore the robustness of the total factor productivity (TFP) re-
sults from table 3 further in appendix table A7. This table reports estima-
tion results for all the variables that we use to calculate TFP. In particular,
our TFP measure uses log(February 2009 sales) instead of log(average
sales for December 2008, January, and February 2009), which we report
in our main tables, including table 3, since we have employees and busi-
ness assets only for February 2009, not the other two months. For sales,
we report the 3-month average in the main tables since, unlike February
2009 sales, the average does not include zeroes and we can thus show the
log specification without losing observations. When we estimate the ef-
fect of the program on log(February 2009 sales) instead, we get larger
point estimates than for the 3-month average.
We use the estimates in table A7 to check whether our TFP results are
consistent with the sales and input results. Our TFPmeasure is defined as
log(February 2009 sales) 2 alpha  log(total employees) 2 beta  log
(business assets). Because the sum of alpha and beta is theoretically ex-
pected to be (and empirically almost always estimated to be) smaller than
or equal to one, changes in TFP are generally equal to the difference be-
tween change in log sales and a weighted average of changes in labor and
capital. Since our estimated change in sales is positive and changes in in-
puts are negative, an upper bound on the change in TFP is given by
change in log sales 1 max[abs(change in log labor), abs(change in log
capital)]. Using the coefficients in column 3 of table A7, this calculation
gives a max of about 0:135 1 0:106 5 0:241, which is close to the esti-
mated TFP change of 0.25.
Another robustness check in table A7 includes materials costs in our
TFP calculations. We do not include materials costs in the main tables
since this variable has many missing values, and using it would thus have
reduced our sample size further. In table A7, we recalculated TFP also
controlling for materials costs, which we define as the sum of material
inputs (raw materials, merchandise, etc.), utilities, and maintenance.
The estimated effect on TFP is slightly smaller in absolute terms when
controlling for materials costs, but the magnitude also corresponds to
about one-fifth of a standard deviation. As a final check in table A7,
we followed a Solow residual approach by calculating TFP as
log February 2009 salesð Þ 2 0:24  log total employmentð Þ
20:16  log business assetsð Þ 2 0:6  log materials costsð Þ:
The estimated effect size is again one-fifth of a standard deviation.
Since only 80 of the 150 firms took up the consulting service and there
are systematic differences between those that took up and those that de-
clined treatment, we repeat our analysis from table 3 using a matchedThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
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Allcontrol group. We match on the variables that are statistically significantly
different across the two groups, as per table 2: an indicator for the man-
ufacturing sector, an indicator for male principal decision maker, num-
ber of employees, firm age, and productivity. All of these variables are
consistently reported for all firms at baseline, except for productivity,
which is missing for a subset of firms at baseline. In these cases we re-
place productivity with zero if it is missing and include an indicator var-
iable equal to one if missing. We use caliper matching on the logit of the
propensity score, with a caliper of 0.2 standard deviations of the logit.
This process is based on Austin (2011, 2014).
The summary statistics for comparing firms that took up the program
to their matches from the control group are in appendix table A8. The
estimated effects from this exercise are in appendix table A9. We see that
the point estimate for productivity is statistically significant and larger
than in the ITTestimation on the full sample. Results for log sales, prof-
its, and ROA are also positive, and the estimated coefficients, on average,
are larger than in the equivalent ITT estimation, but none is statistically
significant.
In appendix tables A10 and A11, we show results on heterogeneity by
enterprise size and sector, respectively. We find essentially no pattern of
impact; but noting the limited power for these tests given the sample
size, we do not draw any conclusion from this analysis.
One final concern with the outcome data from the follow-up survey is
that since the information is self-reported, treatment enterprises could
have reported more positive outcomes to please the surveyors (for trans-
parency reasons, enterprises were informed that the survey was linked
to the consulting program). To address this concern, we test whether
(1) treated enterprises were more likely to provide alternative contact per-
sons on the survey,19 and (2) treatment enterprises were more likely to re-
port sales on the follow-up survey, which should be the case if they wanted
to please the interviewer. Appendix table A12 displays the results for these
tests. We find no statistically significant differences in either measure
across the treatment and control groups, although we recognize that this
is not definitive proof against all self-reporting bias.B. Long-Run Business PerformanceTherefore, we also use administrative data from the IMSS to avoid report-
ing biases stemming from survey data. In addition, the IMSS data allow
us to follow enterprises for a longer time period. Table 4 reports the19 We asked for alternative contact persons in case we needed to get in touch with the
enterprises at a later stage for clarifications or additional questions and could not reach
the enterprise through our contact information on record.
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TABLE 4
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Long-Run Business
Outcomes Difference-in-Difference: OLS
A. ITT Regression Results
Outcome Variable
Number of Employees Daily Wage Bill (US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment  post 5.765*** 125.210***
(1.332) (38.064)
Treatment (5 1 if
mean is for
treatment
group) 21.766*** 230.602***
(.495) (9.512)
Post (5 1 for years
2010–14) 2.116*** 49.802***
(.495) (12.885)
Constant 7.991*** 136.76***
(.492) (6.646)
Observations 14 14
B. Raw Data
Treatment
Mean
(SD)
Control
Mean
(SD)
Difference
(p -Value)
Treatment
Mean
(SD)
Control
Mean
(SD)
Difference
(p -Value)
2005 6.169 7.402 21.233 98.02 128.81 230.79
(13.226) (16.490) (.544) (154.126) (248.604) (.289)
2006 6.281 8.579 22.298 114.29 144.70 230.41
(11.865) (18.853) (.298) (159.164) (293.049) (.365)
2010 9.787 10.262 2.475 162.98 161.89 1.09
(35.958) (21.181) (.895) (353.039) (169.098) (.974)
2011 14.067 10.098 3.970 263.02 169.10 93.92
(66.707) (19.916) (.480) (717.155) (321.992) (.153)
2012 14.551 10.055 4.496 294.252 184.856 109.40
(67.984) (20.668) (.434) (798.781) (343.924) (.131)
2013 16.674 9.963 6.711 339.82 196.25 143.57
(90.136) (19.734) (.361) (967.228) (375.661) (.094)
2014 15.449 10.152 5.297 345.77 220.70 125.07
(79.492) (22.129) (.425) (903.255) (450.607) (.143)
Number of
enterprises 89 164 253 89 164 253This co
All use subject to Unintent downloaded from 018.101.008.
versity of Chicago Press Terms and C189 on Febru
onditions (hary 28, 2019
ttp://www.joNote.—Administrative data are from Mexico’s Social Security Institute (IMSS) for years
2005, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. All enterprises are required by law to register
their workers with IMSS (although compliance is not universal); 57 percent of the enter-
prises in our sample were found in IMSS records. Both number of employees and daily
wage bill refer to permanent employees with pay. Column 3 in panel A displays the results
from a regression of mean number of employees on a dummy for the mean being for the
treatment group, a dummy for the postconsulting intervention period, and the interaction
of these two dummies. Column 6 in panel A shows results for the corresponding regression
with the mean daily wage bill as the outcome variable. Panel B displays the raw data, where
the means in cols. 1, 2, 4, and 5 are the observations used in the regressions in panel A.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 07:48:08 AM
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Alllong-run impact on employment. As discussed above, we do not have
individual firm data for privacy reasons, but rather have the average num-
ber of employees and the average wage bill for 2 years before the treat-
ment and 5 years after (2009–14), separated by treatment and control
groups. We consider having administrative records rather than self-
reported firm data to be amajor advantage and reconfirmation of our re-
sults. We use a difference-in-difference specification, with the treatment
effect being identified by the interaction of treatment and post and the
unit of observation being the treatment group year (i.e., 14 data points,
where each data point is the average of all the firms in that treatment as-
signment year).Wefind an increase of 5.7 employees (SE5 1.3), which
corresponds to 57 percent (the average number of employees in the con-
trol group across the 5 post years is 10.1), and an increase of US$125 in
the daily wage bill (SE5 $38), which is 72 percent (the average daily wage
bill in the control group across the 5 post years is $172).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these results graphically. They show that both
the average number of employees and the daily wage bill were similar
across the treatment and control groups before the consulting program
was implemented (in 2005 and 2006) and were about 50 percent higher
4 and 5 years after the program (in 2013 and 2014).
A caveat here is that when we compare number of full-time employees
from the IMSS data to our follow-up survey data, the IMSS numbers are
lower, suggesting that the enterprises in our sample did not register all
their employees with IMSS (the follow-up survey suggests that our enter-FIG. 2.—Average number of employees in the treatment and control groups over time
(administrative data). Source: Administrative data from the Mexican Social Security Insti-
tute (IMSS). Includes only the 253 firms in our sample that were found in IMSS records
(89 treatment group firms and 164 control group firms).This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 A
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchic-prises had about 15 full-time paid employees on average in 2009, and
2010 IMSS data show about 10 employees on average). The increase in
number of employees in the IMSS data could thus reflect more employ-
ees being registered instead of more employees being hired (though this
still is a desirable outcome from a societal perspective). However, we be-
lieve that had the impact on employees occurred merely through an in-
crease in honest reporting, we would have seen the impact in the short
run. Instead, we observe the effect in the longer run only, which we be-
lieve is an indication that the change is a by-product of firm efficiency,
which takes time to develop, and is not merely a reporting bias.
Not all of the firms in our sample were found in IMSS records, so the
results in table 4 are based on about 57 percent of our sample. To assess
whether there are important compositional changes that influence our
key results, appendix table A2 reports attrition analysis for IMSS data; we
find neither differential attrition for treatment on average (cols. 1 and
2) nor compositional changes (col. 3; aggregate p -value of .122 for the
F -test of joint significance, all interaction terms). In addition, in appen-
dix table A13 we report the main specifications for impact as measured
by the follow-up survey but restrict to the sample of firms for which we
have IMSS data. The results are similar.C. Process VariablesIn order to investigate the channels that drive the observed treatment
effects, we now study how the consulting program changed processesFIG. 3.—Average daily wage bill (US dollars) in the treatment and control groups over
time (administrative data). Source: Administrative data from the Mexican Social Security
Institute (IMSS). Includes only the 253 firms in our sample that were found in IMSS rec
ords (89 treatment group firms and 164 control group firms).M
ago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allwithin the enterprise. We measure these processes as follows: first, the
surveys asked enterprise owners whether or not they implemented cer-
tain changes during the past year, such as developing new products, at-
tracting new investors, and launching a new marketing campaign. Note
that if treatment enterprises believed they should please the program by
reporting process changes that did not actually occur, these estimates
will be upwardly biased.
Table 5 displays the treatment effects on business process variables. We
start with an all-encompassing standardized index, calculated as per
Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), and are not able to reject the null hy-
pothesis of no change (0.072 standard deviation, SE 5 0.104). We find
statistically significant improvements in only two processes: made a
new marketing effort (13 percentage point increase, SE 5 5.5 percent-
age points) and the percentage of enterprises that keep formal accounts
(8 percentage point increase, SE 5 3 percentage points; “formal” is de-
fined as using either an accountant or a computerized system as opposed
to keeping handwritten records or no notes at all). The finding that the
program increased marketing efforts and the use of formal accounting
practices is consistent with the case study evidence mentioned above,
which suggests that many enterprises worked with their mentors on ac-
counting and record keeping, as well as sales strategy and advertising.
Other processes examined, such as registering a patent, developing
new products, or attracting new investors, do not change (or are impre-
cisely estimated; typical standard errors are small, however, about 2–6 per-
centage points). These could be more difficult to detect because they are
more heterogeneous across enterprises or because they require a longer
time to change than is observable in the treatment period. Tomeasure hu-
man resource management practices, we create an index using principal
component analysis (PCA) based on the six questions listed in online ap-
pendix 2.20 We are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on
this index (20.062, SE 5 0.152). In summary, since the content of the
consulting was tailored to each firm’s needs, it is perhaps not surprising
that we do not see, on average, improvements in either the collective in-
dex or most individual processes.
To confirm the existence of a pathway between consulting and perfor-
mance, we regress business outcomes on the business process index, as
well as each of the individual components of the index, and report the20 All PCA indices were created in Stata using the “pca” command. This command com-
putes the leading eigenvectors from the eigen decomposition of the covariance matrix of
the variables used to create the index. We choose the first eigenvector as our PCA index. In
other words, the PCA index is a weighted linear combination of the underlying variables,
where the weights are optimal in the sense that they give the index the largest possible var-
iance.
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impact of consulting services on enterprises 661results in the last three columns of table 5. As before, our different out-
come variables are average sales, profits, and the productivity residual.
Since some firms have missing data at baseline and follow-up, we use
data from the follow-up survey only, that is, outcomes in levels, and use
the 1 percent winsorized sample. We find a positive relationship between
business outcomes and the business process index for all outcomes vari-
ables. The results are statistically significant at conventional levels only
for the regressions with sales and productivity as the dependent variables.
It is also reassuring that the two process variables in which we find a pos-
itive and statistically significant treatment effect in the ITT regressions
(makingmarketing efforts and keepingfinancial accounts) also showa sta-
tistically significant and positive correlation with business performance.
These results suggest a correlation between improved performance and
some of the most relevant business processes. Of course, this analysis does
not provide causal evidence, but it suggests a pathway by which consulting
affects specific practices that may lead to improved firm outcomes.D. Entrepreneurial SpiritWe construct two entrepreneurial spirit indices, developed in collabora-
tion with IPPC. These indices are based on the answers to the eight ques-
tions listed in online appendix 2, which intend to capture entrepreneur-
ial attitudes of the principal decision maker. One index is generated
using PCA, and the other is a standardized index using the Kling et al.
(2007) method. Thus the indices are a combined measure of answers
to a set of questions on the enterprise owners’ beliefs about their ability
to control the success of their business (or whether they are merely sub-
ject to external forces outside of their control) and on the owners’ drive
for success.
Table 6 reports the results. We find a positive impact using the PCA
method (0.237, SE5 0.140) and positive but not a statistically significant
impact using the Kling et al. method (0.130 standard deviation increase,
SE5 0.103). The increase in this index might reflect the fact that enter-
prise owners set new goals as part of the program and that consultants
helped to provide motivation and strategy for how to achieve these goals.
In addition, enterprise owners’ increased confidence in their ability to
control the success of their business could be driven by having better
command of management tools such as marketing and bookkeeping.
We cannot distinguish whether the training had a direct effect on en-
trepreneurial spirit (e.g., enterprise owners set new goals as part of the
program and consultants helped to provide motivation and strategies for
how to achieve these goals) or whether the improvements in the business
that led to higher productivity then improved the spirit of the entrepreneurs.This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
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AllTABLE 6
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Entrepreneurial Spirit: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment
Effect Estimates
Observations
(3)
Control Group
Mean (SD)
(4)(1) (2)
PCA entrepreneurial spirit index .237* .223 373 2.094
(.140) (.139) (1.371)
PCA entrepreneurial spirit index
without components d and e .240* .208 373 2.095
(.140) (.138) (1.343)
KLK entrepreneurial spirit index .130 .128 378 2.055
(.103) (.102) (.964)
KLK entrepreneurial spirit index
without components d and e .153 .140 378 2.064
(.107) (.105) (.961)
Index components:
a. I have professional goals .114* .112* 378 4.531
(.060) (.060) (.651)
b. I revise my goals periodically .128 .115 378 4.029
(.085) (.082) (.840)
c. If I don’t reach a goal in the
way I wanted to I try again 2.033 2.035 378 4.374
(.077) (.077) (.683)
d. I can’t motivate my business
partnersa .064 .055 376 2.277
(.121) (.121) (1.086)
e. Everything I need for success
lies in myself .074 .090 378 3.938
(.112) (.108) (1.025)
f. I prefer to do routine tasks
instead of doing something
new in my worka 2.013 2.017 376 2.000
(.104) (.103) (.964)
g. I think the government
should give me
opportunitiesa 2.061 2.075 377 3.545
(.139) (.132) (1.215)
h. I have to reach some goals
every day to feel satisfied .126 .114 378 3.897
(.109) (.107) (1.076)
Controls for baseline value of
outcome No Yes . . .This content downloaded f
 use subject to University of Chicago rom 018.101.008.189 o
Press Terms and Condin February 28, 20
tions (http://www.Note.—The PCA index is generated using principal components analysis. The KLK in-
dex follows the methodology in Kling et al. (2007) and is the normalized average of z-scores
for all nonmissing process measures, using means and standard deviations in the control
group to calculate the z-scores. Each row in cols. 1 and 2 contains the treatment effect point
estimates and robust standard errors for separate OLS estimations. All regressions include
controls for strata dummies and re-randomization variables, as well as a dummy for having
been surveyed in March 2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up. Column 4 contains means
and standard deviations for the control group at follow-up.
a Component is reverse-coded in the indices.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.19 07:48:08 AM
journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
impact of consulting services on enterprises 665We believe two of the questions used to construct the index are particularly
subject to this second interpretation (questions d and e in online app. 2).
As a robustness check, we construct the indices without these two ques-
tions, and the results do not change.E. Response to Economic ShocksThe program could have also improved enterprise performance by help-
ing enterprises to better cope with the 2008 economic crisis. In the follow-
up survey, about 89 percent of enterprises—in both the treatment and
control groups—reported that they had been affected by the crisis. We
asked these enterprises what changes they made in response to the crisis.
Table 7 reports the answers to these questions and examines whether the
responses differ across the treatment and control groups. The results
show that treatment enterprises are 8 percentage points (SE5 4 percent-TABLE 7
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Changes in Response to Crisis: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment
Effect Estimates
(1)
Observations
(2)
Control Group
Mean (SD)
(3)
Laid off staff or cut down on hiring .047 340 .257
(.051) (.438)
Lowered employee salaries 2.026 340 .092
(.032) (.289)
Cut production 2.080** 340 .206
(.040) (.406)
Diversified business activities 2.015 340 .431
(.057) (.496)
Sought government assistance .056 340 .128
(.044) (.335)
None 2.006 340 .115
(.037) (.319)
Other .043 340 .216
(.050) (.412)
Number of changes made .025 340 1.330
(.092) (.810)This content downloaded fr
All use subject to University of Chicago Pom 018.101.008.189
ress Terms and Cond on February 28, 2
itions (http://wwwNote.—Column 1 contains the treatment effect point estimates and robust standard er-
rors for separate OLS estimations. All outcome variables, except for number of changes
made, are binary variables for the responses to the question, “Which changes has your firm
made in response to the current economic situation?” (multiple answers were allowed).
This question was asked at follow-up in reference to the recent economic crisis. Number
of changes made is a count of the number of changes reported in response to the question
above. These questions were not asked at baseline, which is why we do not control for the
baseline outcome variable in this table. All regressions include controls for strata dummies
and re-randomization variables, as well as a dummy for having been surveyed in March
2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up. Column 3 contains means and standard devia-
tions for the control group at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.019 07:48:08 AM
.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
666 journal of political economy
Allage points) less likely than control enterprises to report that they had to
cut production in response to the crisis. The ability to weather shocks
more effectively could be a result of being able tomore proactively engage
in marketing activities and better control finances, as shown in the previ-
ous section. Enterprises that are less well trained in these skills might ex-
perience economic shocks more passively and do not have tools to coun-
teract a shortfall in demand.
Other changes in response to the crisis are not statistically significant
across the treatment and control groups, but one of magnitude (but not
statistical significance) to note is a positive impact on seeking govern-
ment assistance (a 5.6 percentage point increase, SE 5 4.4 percentage
points, relative to an average of 12.8 percent in the control group). For
enterprises that reported seeking government assistance, we asked which
program or agency they contacted. Most answers indicated state or fed-
eral programs that provide funding or subsidies to micro, small, and
medium-sized enterprises.V. Cost-Effectiveness: Why Don’t More Enterprises
Use Consulting Services?Given the large increases in productivity, and eventual growth in employ-
ees, we ask why more firms do not use consulting services. In particular, a
cost-effectiveness calculation suggests that the returns to hiring a consul-
tant may be well worth the cost. The measured effect of the program on
the daily wage bill of U$125 implies an increase in the annual wage bill of
US$125 3655US$45,625.21 The annual cost of the consulting services
was US$11,856. Since the program was highly subsidized, participating
enterprises had to pay only between 10 percent and 30 percent of this
cost (depending on firm size). Among the enterprises in the treatment
group, only 53 percent chose to participate in the subsidized consulting
program once offered a spot. Although we do not attempt to translate
the job growth to firm profits, given the relative magnitude, we note that
the annual return on labor to the firm need not be very high in order to
justify the one-time consulting expenditure.
Several issues may hinder the market for consulting services. First,
there may be no failure at all: those who opt in may be the ones who
can benefit, and those who do not opt in would not benefit. Naturally,
we do not observe what the impact would have been on those who did
not opt in, but given the large increase in productivity and long-term em-
ployment on the intent to treat, there seems to remain a failure for those21 A potential caveat with this calculation is that the measured increase in the wage bill
may be influenced by outliers. Since we do not have firm-level data on the wage bill and our
estimates are based on the simple average in the treatment and control groups, we cannot
examine how the effect size would vary when winsorizing or trimming outliers.
This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
impact of consulting services on enterprises 667who did opt in, in that they had not taken up the services before, even at
the unsubsidized rate. It is important to emphasize that all enterprises in
our study had initially expressed interest in the subsidized consulting
program, and thus their views are not representative of enterprises that
do not have a preexisting interest in consulting services. It could be that
firms expressed an interest, learnedmore about the service, and then de-
cided that this was unlikely to yield profitable results for them, and thus
failure to take up remains a rational and correct decision.
Second, there may be a credit market failure. In fact, most of the en-
terprises in the treatment group that declined participation in the pro-
gram once offered a spot gave liquidity constraints as the reason. How-
ever, this does not fully satisfy the question, Why do we not observe
consulting firms accepting delayed payment or working with financial
services firms to provide credit to cover their services? Either way, it sug-
gests that a credit market failure is the source of the problem for some
enterprises. This may be particularly relevant given the timing of the im-
pacts; that is, in the short run we do not observe higher profits but rather
increased productivity. It is not until the long run that we see evidence of
likely increased firm size that could be useful for generating liquidity to
pay for consulting services.
Third, entrepreneurs may be risk or ambiguity averse with respect to
thepotential returns fromhiring a consultant. This aversion could beper-
petuated by lack of information in the market on the returns to consult-
ing advice (of which consulting firms have difficulty credibly signaling).
To examine this issue, in the follow-up survey we included some quali-
tative questions for the control group on whether they were using any
consulting or mentoring services, and if not, why not. About 21 percent
of control group enterprises said that they were indeed using some ser-
vices and provided the name of the consulting firm they were using. Ex-
amining these names reveals that only about half of these firms offer
management consulting services similar to the consulting firms that
workedwith the treatment group enterprises. Theother firmsmentioned
by the control group provide specialized services, such as accounting or
technical assistance. Overall, the incidence of using management con-
sulting services in the control group appears to be around 10 percent.
Table 8 lists the self-reported reasons why control group enterprises do
not use consulting services. By far, themost frequently mentioned reason
is lack of funds (46.3 percent of enterprises mention this reason), fol-
lowed by uncertainty about the benefits of consulting services (22.2 per-
cent) and simply not having considered hiring a consultant (18.5 per-
cent). The response could be genuine disinterest in consulting services
or ambiguity about a service whose quality is not assured.
Our findings indicate that management consulting services can have
high returns for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, and weThis content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allconsider funding constraints and uncertainty about the benefits to be
the most likely explanations for the lack of market transactions in con-
sulting services.VI. Discussion and ConclusionOur results suggest that lack of managerial skills constitutes an important
constraint to firm growth and the ability to withstand economic shocks.
The documented effects on productivity and return on assets in the short
run, and employment in the long run, are large. However, the short-run
impact on productivity and return on assets, albeit statistically significant
only at 10 percent, is similar to smaller point estimates fromother studies.
Thus, while we believe that the magnitude of the impact is not unreason-
able given that many enterprises in the sample had not received any for-
malmanagement training prior to our intervention, we note that the con-
fidence intervals exclude zero but do include fairly small but positive
treatment effects.
Comparing our results to those of Bloom et al. (2013) provides some
potentially useful insights. While our point estimates are considerably
larger, the confidence intervals encompass each other’s results. How-
ever, there is good reason to believe that there may be decreasing returns
to consulting with firm size between the small and medium to large-size
firms across those two studies. First, the management advice delivered
here is much simpler and thus easier to transmit and implement, as com-
pared to that of Bloom et al. Second, the firms are smaller, with fewer
levels of administration, and thus can more easily implement organiza-
tional changes. On the other end of the spectrum for firm size, a consult-
ing intervention for micro entrepreneurs in Ghana (tailors) actually led
to negative treatment effects, as tailors shifted toward advice given that
did not yield higher profits and then switched back to earlier practicesTABLE 8
Self-Reported Reasons for Not Using Consulting Services in Control Group Firms
Reasons for Not Using Consulting Services
Percent of Enterprises Mentioning
This Reason (Multiple Mention)
Would be a good investment, but don’t have funds 46.3
Don’t know what the benefits would be 22.2
Simply hadn’t considered it 18.5
Didn’t need the services 13.9
Other 11.1
Didn’t know these services existed 7.4
Not worth the cost 5.6
Observations 108This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and ConNote.—This table includes all control group firms that, at the time of the follow-up sur-
vey, reported never having used consulting services. on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
ditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
impact of consulting services on enterprises 669(Karlan et al. 2015). A possible explanation is that these micro entrepre-
neurs had aspirations to grow (and false optimism) but did not have the
capacity to adopt the more advanced business practices. Analysis across
our larger and smaller firms is not precisely estimated enough to draw
robust conclusions, but we note that the point estimates are inconsistent:
smaller firms have larger impacts on business assets and return on assets
but smaller impacts on the productivity residual outcome.
The organizational changes implemented as a result of the consulting
services seem to bemost focused around improvements inmarketing and
financial controls and more efficient use of inputs in the short run. Con-
sultants also appear to have helped enterprises set clear goals and define
a strategy forhow to achieve these goals.We see that the overall “entrepre-
neurial spirit” or confidence in owners increases as a result of the inter-
vention. However, the evidence on any one specific mechanism is weak,
with only two out of 11 individual management practices showing an in-
crease. Although desirable to identify specific mechanisms, we conjec-
ture that such a one-size-fits-all solution is not realistic. The large impact
on employment in the long run is not observed in the short run, indicat-
ing that growth occurred through a combination of mechanisms such as
improved marketing and goal setting as well as efficient use of existing
capital. These short-run changes did then lead to a more efficient and
scalable enterprise, as evidenced by the long-term growth in number of
employees and wages paid.22
Naturally, if consulting generates high returns, an obvious question to
pose is whether the consulting arrangements persisted after the subsidy
ended. In 2014, we completed interviews with two of the consulting firms
(either the other firms did not respond or the key parties were no longer
at the firm). The interviews focused on understanding whether relation-
ships with any of the participating enterprises continued after the subsidy
period and furthermore to learn how these consulting firms typically mar-
ket their services. For one of the consulting firms, 13 out of 19 of the par-
ticipating enterprises continued the consulting after the subsidy ended,
whereas for the other consulting firm, zero enterprises continued the con-
sulting (the second firmhas shifted away from consulting and now focuses
on government contracts for evaluation and planning). This could be due
to differential quality of the consulting but also could be due to enterprise
size, as the first consulting firm’s participating clients were considerably
larger than the second’s, and smaller firms were reportedly less likely to
act strategically in planning for the future and expanding. In discussing22 A study that separately taught or tackled one type of problem at a time is likely an un-
realistic method for conducting randomized trials, as it would require massive sample sizes
to tease out each mechanism separately. Even then, the external validity of any one discov-
ered magic mechanism would be at risk of being context specific (e.g., to that particular
regulatory, industry, macroeconomic, political, or natural resource environment).
This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
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Allmarketing of the consulting services, both firms reported that mass mar-
keting would likely lead to a poor selection of clients, clients who are not
fully committed to engaging with the consultants and adopting recom-
mended changes, and they thus rely instead on word of mouth to gener-
ate new business.
Overall, our results confirm that managerial inputs have a large and
important impact on firm performance and even hiring decisions in
the intermediate run. However, there is still much to learn about the
way this information affects firm performance as a whole and, more spe-
cifically, how it interacts with the marginal productivity of inputs such as
labor and capital. In addition, while there may be a lot of heterogeneity
in effects, our sample is not large enough to allow us to look at all the
firm-level interactions that might be of interest, such as competitive na-
ture of the industry, age and gender of the owner, owner’s ambition level,
risk-taking ability, or general skill levels. We believe that this is a critical area
for further research.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Analysis of Attrition in Follow-Up Survey: OLS
Dependent Variable: Binary 5 1 if Enterprise
Was Not Interviewed or Not Conﬁrmed
Closed at Follow-Up
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 2.020 2.017 .141
(.029) (.030) (.157)
Commerce sector dummy .021 .047
(.039) (.049)
Services sector dummy .041 .072*
(.033) (.042)
Full-time paid employees .001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Age of principal decision maker
(years) .001 .001
(.001) (.002)
Male principal decision maker
dummy 2.043 2.020
(.036) (.045)
Business age (years) .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Log(average sales July, Aug., and
Sept. 2007 in US$1,000s) .002 .000
(.008) (.011)
Profits (Sept. 2007 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s) 2.000 2.000
(.000) (.000)
ROA .002 2.021
(.025) (.038)This content downloaded fro
 use subject to University of Chicago Prem 018.101.008.189 on
ss Terms and Condit February 28, 2019
ions (http://www.jo 07:48:08 AM
urnals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A1 (Continued)
Dependent Variable: Binary 5 1 if Enterprise
Was Not Interviewed or Not Conﬁrmed
Closed at Follow-Up
(1) (2) (3)
Commerce sector dummy 
treatment 2.071
(.080)
Services sector dummy 
treatment 2.094
(.073)
Full-time paid employees 
treatment .000
(.002)
Age of principal decision maker
(years)  treatment 2.001
(.003)
Male principal decision maker
dummy  treatment 2.078
(.074)
Business age (years)  treatment 2.000
(.003)
Log(average sales)  treatment .006
(.017)
Profits  treatment 2.000
(.000)
ROA  treatment .057
(.045)
Constant .106*** .056 .003
(.018) (.076) (.102)
R 2 .001 .039 .053
Observations 432 432 432
F -test p -value: joint significance of
interaction terms .850
Mean of dependent variable .100 .100 .100This content downloaded
All use subject to University of Chicago from 018.101.008.18
 Press Terms and Co9 on February 28, 2
nditions (http://wwNote.—All explanatory variables are measured at baseline. Binary control variables are
included for when covariate is missing, and then the missing covariate is coded as zero. Var-
iables with  treatment are interacted with a treatment group dummy. Robust standard er-
rors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.019 07:48:08 AM
w.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AllTABLE A2
Analysis of Matching with IMSS Data: OLS
Dependent Variable: Binary 5 1 if Enterprise
Was Matched with IMSS Data
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment .019 .014 2.011
(.050) (.049) (.257)
Commerce sector dummy 2.017 .016
(.061) (.075)
Services sector dummy .042 .088
(.054) (.069)
Full-time paid employees .000 .002***
(.001) (.001)
Age of principal decision
maker (years) 2.001 2.002
(.002) (.003)
Male principal decision
maker dummy .102* .036
(.053) (.064)
Business age (years) 2.000 2.001
(.001) (.001)
Log(average sales July, Aug., and
Sept. 2007 in US$1,000s) .082*** .084***
(.014) (.017)
Profits (Sept. 2007 sales
minus costs, US$1,000s) .000 .000*
(.000) (.000)
ROA 2.004 2.020
(.030) (.043)
Commerce sector dummy 
treatment 2.072
(.132)
Services sector dummy  treatment 2.077
(.120)
Full-time paid employees 
treatment 2.006**
(.002)
Age of principal decision maker
(years)  treatment .001
(.005)
Male principal decision maker
dummy  treatment .146
(.110)
Business age (years)  treatment .005
(.004)
Log(average sales)  treatment .008
(.035)
Profits  treatment 2.000
(.000)
ROA  treatment .010
(.057)
Constant .567*** .327*** .331**
(.030) (.120) (.147)
R 2 .000 .121 .152
Observations 432 432 432This content downloaded from
 use subject to University of Chicago Pres672
 018.101.008.189 
s Terms and Condon February 28, 20
itions (http://www.19 07:48:08 AM
journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A2 (Continued)
Dependent Variable: Binary 5 1 if Enterprise
Was Matched with IMSS Data
(1) (2) (3)
F -test p -value: joint significance of
interaction terms .124
Mean of dependent variable .574 .574 .574This content downloaded f
All use subject to University of Chicago P673
rom 018.101.008.1
ress Terms and C89 on February 28
onditions (http://wwNote.—All explanatory variables are measured at baseline. Binary control variables are
included for when covariate is missing, and then the missing covariate is coded as zero. Var-
iables with  treatment are interacted with a treatment group dummy. Robust standard er-
rors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.TABLE A3
Number of Enterprises Surveyed Each Month: Follow-Up Survey
Survey Month
Number of
Treatments
Percent of
Treatments
Number of
Controls
Percent of
Controls
March 2009 95 70.37 152 62.55
April 2009 29 21.48 68 27.98
May 2009 10 7.41 20 8.23
June 2009 1 .74 3 1.23, 2019 
w.jou07:48:08 AM
rnals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AllTABLE A4
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Short-Run Business
Outcomes, Restricted Sample: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates Control Group
Mean (SD)
(3)(1) (2)
Full-time paid employees 21.771 21.341 13.182
(1.389) (1.103) (19.925)
221 221 143
Log(total employees) 2.158 2.069 2.352
(.124) (.092) (1.064)
221 221 143
Average sales Dec. 2008, Jan. and
Feb. 2009 (US$1,000s) 214.720 211.426 69.450
(14.976) (12.218) (181.105)
221 221 143
Log(average sales Dec. 2008, Jan.
and Feb. 2009 in US$1,000s) 2.016 2.019 2.520
(.211) (.176) (1.985)
221 221 143
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s) 212.367 213.203 46.598
(11.412) (10.956) (111.674)
221 221 143
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s) 3.793 3.788 13.161
(6.628) (6.332) (102.459)
221 221 143
Log(business assets) 2.078 2.118 4.432
(.192) (.169) (1.738)
221 221 143
Productivity residual from regres-
sion of log Feb. 2009 sales on log
employees and log business
assets .261* .249* 2.073
(.158) (.146) (1.302)
221 221 143
ROA Feb. 2009 sales minus costs
divided by assets .118* .112 .018
(.065) (.068) (.487)
221 221 143
Controls for baseline value of
outcome No Yes . . .This content downloaded fr
 use subject to University of Chicago P674
om 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 20
ress Terms and Conditions (http://www.Note.—This table includes only enterprises that report all outcome variables. Each cell
in cols. 1 and 2 contains the treatment effect point estimate, robust standard error, and
number of observations for a separate OLS estimation. For the regressions that control
for the outcome variable measured at baseline (col. 2), when the baseline outcome vari-
able is missing, the missing value is filled in with zero and a dummy variable indicating that
the baseline observation is missing is added to the model. All regressions include controls
for strata dummies and re-randomization variables, as well as a dummy for having been sur-
veyed in March 2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up. Column 3 contains means and
standard deviations for the control group at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.19 07:48:08 AM
journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A5
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Short-Run Business
Outcomes, Difference-in-Difference: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT
Treatment
Effect
Estimates
(1)
1%
Winsorized
(2)
1%
Trimmed
(3)
Control
Group
Mean (SD)
(4)
Full-time paid employees .578 2.447 21.301 12.428
(2.351) (2.004) (1.307) (22.281)
810 810 792 243
Log(total employees) 2.046 2.046 2.039 2.319
(.111) (.111) (.107) (1.106)
805 805 787 241
Average sales Dec. 2008, Jan. and
Feb. 2009 (US$1,000s) 214.464 28.096 22.791 63.384
(23.358) (16.725) (11.838) (163.643)
675 675 659 200
Log(average sales Dec. 2008, Jan.
and Feb. 2009 in US$1,000s) .017 .025 .062 2.391
(.237) (.236) (.238) (2.023)
675 675 659 200
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s) 27.333 1.697 23.942 43.157
(25.419) (12.144) (8.900) (113.758)
681 681 665 204
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s) 215.357 8.052 10.149 11.460
(20.485) (9.859) (7.911) (97.044)
602 602 588 176
Log(business assets) 2.098 2.104 2.207 4.307
(.227) (.224) (.220) (1.699)
627 627 611 203
Productivity residual from
regression of log Feb. 2009
sales on log employees and
log business assets .306 .302 .251 2.095
(.217) (.212) (.190) (1.272)
515 515 503 158
ROA Feb. 2009 sales minus costs
divided by assets .272** .160* .062 .012
(.133) (.094) (.065) (.471)
488 488 476 154This content downloade
All use subject to University of Chicag675
d from 018.1
o Press Term01.008.189 on F
s and Conditionebruary 28, 20
s (http://wwwNote.—Each cell in cols. 1, 2, and 3 contains the treatment effect point estimate, robust
standard error, and number of observations for a separate OLS difference-in-difference es-
timation. Each regression uses the full sample of enterprises at baseline and follow-up and
includes a dummy for being in the treatment group, a dummy for the follow-up period, an
interaction term between the treatment and follow-up dummies, as well as controls for strata
dummies, re-randomization variables, and a dummy for having been surveyed inMarch 2009
(vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up. The point estimates displayed in cols. 1, 2, and 3 are
coefficients on the interaction term between treatment and follow-up. In col. 2, outcome var-
iables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. In col. 3, outcome variables are
trimmed at the top and bottom 1 percent. Column 4 contains nonwinsorized, untrimmed
means and standard deviations for the control group at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.19 07:48:08 AM
.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AllTABLE A6
Follow-Up Summary Statistics: Short-Run Business Outcomes:
Means and Standard Deviations
Treatment
(1)
Control
(2)
(1)2(2)
Difference
(p -Value)
(3)
Treatment
and
Took Up
(4)
(4)–(2)
Difference
(p -Value)
(5)
Average sales Dec. 2008,
Jan. and Feb. 2009
(US$1,000s) 53.889 63.384 29.495 61.075 22.309
(160.545) (163.643) (.624) (103.216) (.897)
Average sales Dec. 2008,
Jan. and Feb. 2009
(US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 48.298 57.721 29.422 61.075 3.354
(114.908) (124.174) (.506) (103.216) (.835)
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s) 42.353 43.157 2.804 42.882 2.275
(167.711) (113.758) (.965) (85.825) (.985)
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 33.788 39.310 25.522 43.519 4.210
(92.327) (83.425) (.613) (85.991) (.752)
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales
minus costs, US$1,000s) 10.964 11.460 2.496 15.804 4.344
(45.858) (97.044) (.955) (57.117) (.693)
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales
minus costs, US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 10.964 6.758 4.206 15.804 9.046
(45.858) (48.976) (.491) (57.117) (.315)
Business assets (US$1,000s) 258.923 331.416 272.493 313.187 218.229
(508.865) (1236.195) (.464) (560.688) (.872)
Business assets (US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 259.310 267.828 28.519 314.068 46.239
(508.444) (607.125) (.893) (560.489) (.581)
Productivity residual from
regression of log Feb.
2009 sales on log
employees and log assets .163 2.095 .257* .429 .524***
(.967) (1.272) (.073) (.854) (.001)
Productivity residual,
1% winsorized .157 2.089 .247* .419 .508***
(.951) (1.229) (.078) (.820) (.001)
ROA: Feb. 2009 sales minus
costs divided by assets .091 .012 .080 .174 .162**
(.402) (.471) (.174) (.429) (.032)
ROA, 1% winsorized .089 .031 .058 .174 .143**
(.393) (.290) (.236) (.429) (.039)This content downloa
 use subject to University of Chided from 01
cago Press T676
8.101.008.18
erms and Con9 on Februar
ditions (httpy 28, 2019 07
://www.journNote.—Columns 1, 2, and 4 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses).
Column 3 shows the difference in means across the treatment and control groups with
the corresponding p -value in parentheses. Column 5 shows the nonexperimental differ-
ence between those who took up in treatment minus those in control and the correspond-
ing p -value in parentheses. The 1 percent winsorized variables are winsorized at the top and
bottom1 percent.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.:48:08 AM
als.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A7
Robustness Checks for TFP Measure: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment Effect
Estimates Control Group
Mean (SD)
(3)(1) (2)
Productivity residual from regres-
sion of log Feb. 2009 sales on log
employees and log business assets .270* .250* 2.095
(.141) (.130) (1.272)
250 250 158
Log(Feb. 2009 sales) .097 .135 11.720
(.183) (.154) (2.003)
285 285 184
Log(total employees) 2.117 2.074 2.319
(.092) (.071) (1.106)
375 375 241
Log(business assets) 2.055 2.106 4.307
(.176) (.157) (1.699)
319 319 203
Log(materials costs) 2.122 2.054 1.486
(.218) (.190) (2.103)
299 299 198
Productivity residual including
materials costs from regression
of log Feb. 2009 sales on log
employees, log business assets,
and log materials costs .212* .197* 2.083
(.120) (.111) (.879)
220 220 140
Solow residual: log(Feb, 2009 sales)2
.24 log employees2 .16
log assets2 .6 logmaterials
costs .197 .194* 9.462
(.125) (.116) (.907)
220 220 140
Controls for baseline value
of outcome No Yes . . .This content downloaded fro
All use subject to University of Chicago Pr677
m 018.101.008.189 on February 28
ess Terms and Conditions (http://wNote.—Each row in cols. 1 and 2 contains the treatment effect point estimate, robust
standard error, and number of observations for a separate OLS estimation. For the regres-
sions that control for the outcome variable measured at baseline (col. 2), when the base-
line outcome variable is missing, the missing value is filled in with zero and a dummy var-
iable indicating that the baseline observation is missing is added to the model. All
regressions include controls for strata dummies and re-randomization variables, as well
as a dummy for having been surveyed in March 2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-
up. Column 3 contains means and standard deviations for the control group at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level., 2019 07:48:08 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AllTABLE A8
Baseline Summary Statistics for Matched Sample:
Means and Standard Deviations
Took Up
Treatment
(1)
Matched Control
(2)
Orthogonality
Verification
(1)2(2) Difference
(p -Value)
(3)
A. Stratification Variables
Manufacturing sector dummy .351 .377 2.026
(.480) (.488) (.740)
Commerce sector dummy .234 .221 .013
(.426) (.417) (.849)
Services sector dummy .416 .403 .013
(.496) (.494) (.871)
Full-time paid employees 18.623 15.675 2.948
(36.772) (27.900) (.576)
B. Re-randomization Variables
Principal decision maker’s
age (years) 42.195 41.701 .494
(10.584) (10.395) (.771)
Male principal decision maker
dummy .792 .831 2.039
(.408) (.377) (.539)
Principal decision maker’s years
of schooling 16.060 16.744 2.683
(4.540) (4.655) (.358)
Business age (years) 12.779 11.649 1.130
(11.668) (12.552) (.564)
Observations 77 77 154
C. Other Variables: Business Outcomes
Average sales July, Aug., and
Sept. 2007 (US$1,000s) 106.420 73.254 33.166
(357.791) (166.201) (.501)
Average sales July, Aug., and
Sept. 2007 (US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 85.079 69.063 16.016
(212.235) (137.431) (.612)
Sept. 2007 costs (US$1,000s) 49.518 68.860 219.341
(131.473) (223.200) (.540)
Sept. 2007 costs (US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 49.343 52.008 22.665
(126.101) (101.520) (.892)
Profits (Sept. 2007 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s) 16.514 2.916 13.598
(58.843) (215.671) (.636)
Profits (Sept. 2007 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 16.514 21.598 25.084
(58.843) (81.898) (.695)
Business assets (US$1,000s) 326.745 282.504 44.242
(779.147) (359.395) (.695)This content downloaded fro
 use subject to University of Chicago Pre678
m 018.101.008
ss Terms and.189 on February 28,
 Conditions (http://ww 2019 07:48:08 AM
w.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A8 (Continued)
Took Up
Treatment
(1)
Matched Control
(2)
Orthogonality
Verification
(1)2(2) Difference
(p -Value)
(3)
Business assets (US$1,000s),
1% winsorized 309.084 283.555 25.528
(662.846) (358.922) (.797)
Productivity residual (from re-
gression of log Sept. 2007 sales
on log employees and log assets) .516 .455 .061
(1.339) (1.269) (.817)
Productivity residual,
1% winsorized .501 .455 .046
(1.307) (1.269) (.859)
ROA: Sept. 2007 sales minus costs
divided by assets .170 .268 2.098
(.368) (1.088) (.559)
ROA: 1% winsorized .170 .204 2.034
(.368) (.811) (.791)
Observations 77 77 154This content downloaded
All use subject to University of Chicago679
 from 018.101
 Press Terms .008.189 on February
and Conditions (http:/Note.—Results may change depending on the version of Stata used. To replicate the val-
ues in this table, use Stata 13. Columns 1 and 2 present means and standard deviations (in
parentheses). Column 3 shows the difference in means across the treatment enterprises
that took up the program and the matched control group, with the corresponding p -value
in parentheses. The 1 percent winsorized variables are winsorized at the top and bottom
1 percent. 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
/www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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AllTABLE A10
Heterogeneous Treatment Effect Estimates, Short-Run
Business Outcomes, by Enterprise Size: OLS
Outcome Variable
Coefficient on
Treatment
Dummy
(1)
Coefficient
on Treatment
Interacted with
Small or
Medium Enterprise
Dummy
(2)
F -Test p -Value: Sum
of Coefficients
in Cols. 1 1 2
(3)
Full-time paid employees 2.000 1.918 .641
(.739) (4.127)
378 378
Log(total employees) 2.066 2.029 .427
(.086) (.148)
375 375
Average sales Dec. 2008, Jan.
and Feb. 2009 (US$1,000s) 26.058 221.293 .410
(9.575) (35.412)
307 307
Log(average sales Dec. 2008,
Jan. and Feb. 2009 in
US$1,000s) .021 .104 .583
(.184) (.302)
307 307
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s) 26.285 47.314 .428
(7.169) (51.588)
304 304
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales minus
costs, US$1,000s) 5.781 21.743 .835
(5.740) (21.492)
265 265
Log(business assets) 2.179 .298 .730
(.172) (.378)
319 319
Productivity residual: from
regression of log Feb. 2009
sales on log employees
and log business assets .337** 2.321 .939
(.158) (.268)
250 250
ROA: Feb. 2009 sales minus
costs divided by assets .059 .154 .171
(.069) (.172)
236 236This content downloade
 use subject to University of Chicag682
d from 018.101.0
o Press Terms an08.189 on February 28
d Conditions (http://wwNote.—Each row contains the treatment effect point estimates, robust standard errors,
and number of observations for a separate OLS estimation. All regressions control for the
outcome variable measured at baseline; when the baseline outcome variable is missing, the
missing value is filled in with zero and a dummy variable indicating that the baseline ob-
servation is missing is added to the model. All regressions also include controls for strata
dummies and re-randomization variables, as well as a dummy for having been surveyed in
March 2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level., 2019 07:48:08 AM
w.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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TABLE A12
Nonresponse on Follow-Up Survey
Treatment
(1)
Control
(2)
(1)2(2) Difference
(p -Value)
(3)
% that did not provide alternative
contact person 16.296 18.519 22.222
(.584)
% that did not report Dec. 2008,
Jan. and Feb. 2009 sales 20.741 17.695 3.045
(.477)
Observations 135 243 378This content downloaded fro
All use subject to University of Chicago Pr685
m 018.101.008.18
ess Terms and Co9 on February
nditions (http:/Note.—Columns 1 and 2 show the percentage of enterprises in the treatment and con-
trol groups, respectively, that did not provide an alternative contact person or sales on the
follow-up survey, conditional on participating in the survey. Column 3 shows the difference
in percentages between the treatment and control groups with the corresponding p -value
in parentheses.TABLE A13
ITT Treatment Effect Estimates, Short-Run Business Outcomes, IMSS Sample: OLS
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment Effect
Estimates Control Group
Mean (SD)
(3)(1) (2)
Full-time paid employees .764 .380 15.932
(1.841) (1.405) (25.703)
229 229 148
Log(total employees) 2.161 2.157* 2.588
(.111) (.084) (1.084)
229 229 148
Average sales Dec. 2008, Jan. and
Feb. 2009 (US$1,000s) 217.701 216.381 77.325
(23.164) (14.531) (161.353)
187 187 125
Log(average sales Dec. 2008, Jan.
and Feb. 2009 in US$1,000s) 2.182 2.104 3.045
(.204) (.168) (1.713)
187 187 125
Feb. 2009 costs (US$1,000s) 21.529 23.804 63.156
(23.042) (19.729) (141.134)
176 176 120
Profits (Feb. 2009 sales minus costs,
US$1,000s) 5.566 5.904 2.321
(8.197) (8.102) (43.806)
160 160 109
Log(business assets) 2.012 2.008 4.655
(.208) (.202) (1.624)
187 187 121
Productivity residual: from regres-
sion of log Feb. 2009 sales on log
employees and log business assets .080 .088 .116
(.181) (.170) (1.154)
152 152 99 28
/w, 2019 07:48:08 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
686 journal of political economy
AllTABLE A13 (Continued)
Outcome Variable
ITT Treatment Effect
Estimates Control Group
Mean (SD)
(3)(1) (2)
ROA: Feb. 2009 sales minus costs
divided by assets .173* .197* 2.001
(.098) (.113) (.574)
140 140 95
Controls for baseline value
of outcome No Yes . . .This content downloaded from 0
 use subject to University of Chicago Press T18.101.008.189 on February 28, 20
erms and Conditions (http://www.Note.—This table includes only enterprises that were successfully matched with IMSS
data. Each cell in cols. 1 and 2 contains the treatment effect point estimate, robust stan-
dard error, and number of observations for a separate OLS estimation. For the regressions
that control for the outcome variable measured at baseline (col. 2), when the baseline out-
come variable is missing, the missing value is filled in with zero and a dummy variable in-
dicating that the baseline observation is missing is added to the model. All regressions in-
clude controls for strata dummies and re-randomization variables, as well as a dummy for
having been surveyed in March 2009 (vs. April, May, or June) at follow-up. Column 3 con-
tains means and standard deviations for the control group at follow-up.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.References
Austin, Peter C. 2011. “Optimal Caliper Widths for Propensity-Score Matching
When Estimating Differences in Means and Differences in Proportions in Ob-
servational Studies.” Pharmaceutical Statis. 10 (2): 150–61.
———. 2014. “A Comparison of 12 Algorithms for Matching on the Propensity
Score.” Statis. in Medicine 33 (6): 1057–69.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. 2015. “Six Randomized
Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps.” American Econ.
J.: Appl. Econ. 7 (1): 1–21.
Bennedsen, Morten, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, and
Daniel Wolfenzon. 2007. “Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Suc-
cession Decisions and Performance.” Q.J.E. 122 (2): 647–91.
Bertrand, Marianne, and Antoinette Schoar. 2003. “Managing with Style: The Ef-
fect of Managers on Firm Policies.” Q.J.E. 118 (4): 1169–1208.
Bloom, Nicholas, Benn Eifert, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie, and John Rob-
erts. 2013. “Does Management Matter? Evidence from India.” Q.J.E. 128 (Feb-
ruary): 1–51.
Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2007. “Measuring and Explaining Man-
agement Practices across Firms and Countries.” Q.J.E. 122 (4): 1341–1408.
———. 2010. “Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms and Coun-
tries?” J. Econ. Perspectives 24 (1): 203–24.
Bruhn, Miriam, Dean Karlan, and Antoinette Schoar. 2010. “What Capital Is
Missing in Developing Countries?” A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 100 (2): 629–33.
Bruhn, Miriam, and David McKenzie. 2009. “In Pursuit of Balance: Randomiza-
tion in Practice in Development Field Experiments.” American Econ. J.: Appl.
Econ. 1 (4): 200–232.
Bruhn, Miriam, and Bilal Zia. 2011. “Stimulating Managerial Capital in Emerg-
ing Markets: The Impact of Business and Financial Literacy for Young Entre-19 07:48:08 AM
journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
impact of consulting services on enterprises 687preneurs.” Policy ResearchWorking Paper no. 5642, World Bank, Washington,
DC.
Caselli, Francesco, and Nicola Gennaioli. 2013. “Dynastic Management.” Econ.
Inquiry 51 (1): 971–96.
Cole, Shawn, Thomas Sampson, and Bilal Zia. 2011. “Prices or Knowledge? What
Drives Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets?” J. Finance 66 (6):
1933–67.
de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff. 2008. “Returns
to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” Q.J.E.
123 (4): 1329–72.
———. 2009. “MeasuringMicroenterprise Profits: Must We Ask How the Sausage
Is Made?” J. Development Econ. 88 (1): 19–31.
Drexler, Alejandro, Greg Fischer, and Antoinette Schoar. 2014. “Keeping It Sim-
ple: Financial Literacy and Rules of Thumb.” American Econ. J.: Appl. Econ.
6 (2): 1–31.
Fischer, Greg, and Dean Karlan. 2015. “The Catch-22 of External Validity in the
Context of Constraints to Firm Growth.” A.E.R. 105 (5): 295–99.
Furnham, Adrian, andHoward Steele. 1993. “Measuring Locus of Control: A Cri-
tique of General, Children’s, Health- and Work-Related Locus of Control
Questionnaires.” British J. Psychology 84 (4): 443–79.
Giné, Xavier, and Ghazala Mansuri. 2014. “Money or Ideas? A Field Experiment on
Constraints to Entrepreneurship in Rural Pakistan.” Working Paper no. WPS6959,
World Bank,Washington, DC.
Giorcelli, Michela. 2016. “The Long-Term Effects of Management and Technol-
ogy Transfer: Evidence from the US Productivity Program.” Working paper,
Stanford Univ.
Gompers, Paul, Josh Lerner, and David Scharfstein. 2005. “Entrepreneurial
Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986 to
1999.” J. Finance 60 (2): 577–614.
Karlan, Dean, Ryan Knight, and Christopher Udry. 2015. “Consulting and Cap-
ital Experiments with Microenterprise Tailors in Ghana.” J. Econ. Behavior and
Org. 118 (October): 281–302.
Karlan, Dean, andMartin Valdivia. 2011. “Teaching Entrepreneurship: Impact of
Business Training on Microfinance Clients and Institutions.” Rev. Econ. and
Statis. 93 (2): 510–27.
King, R. G., and R. Levine. 1993. “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right.” Q.J.E. 108 (3): 717–37.
Kling, Jeffrey, Jeffrey Liebman, and Lawrence Katz. 2007. “Experimental Analysis
of Neighborhood Effects.” Econometrica 75 (1): 83–120.
McKenzie, David. 2012. “Beyond Baseline and Follow-Up: The Case for More T
in Experiments.” J. Development Econ. 99 (2): 210–21.
———. 2015. “Identifying and Spurring High-Growth Entrepreneurship: Exper-
imental Evidence from a Business Plan Competition.” Policy Research Work-
ing Paper Series, no. 7391, World Bank, Washington, DC. https://ideas.repec
.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/7391.html.
Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. 1998. “Financial Dependence and Growth.”
A.E.R. 88 (3): 559–86.
Syverson, Chad. 2011. “What Determines Productivity?” J. Econ. Literature 49 (2):
326–65.This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:48:08 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
